| Abortion And The Voice Of Scripture |
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| Posted on : 31 Oct, 2005 | Total Views : 633 |
Abortion and the Voice of Scripture
William Ross Blackburn
Does Scripture speak to the matter of abortion? If so, how? I want to approach
the question by responding to Professor Richard Hays’ essay on abortion,
the final chapter of his book The Moral Vision of the New Testament.
1. I take this approach for two reasons. First, in his reading of Scripture, Hays
arrives at a “pro-choice” position.
2. While Hays speaks of abortion as a grave
matter, and offers insight concerning how the Christian church might deal
with crisis pregnancies without resorting to abortion, he ultimately concludes
that Scripture is silent on the matter. Accordingly, Hays writes “it is perhaps
inevitable that Christians will in good conscience reach different conclusions.”
3. The following critique of Hays’ essay will seek to demonstrate that,
far from being silent, Scripture speaks distinctly on behalf of unborn children
and their mothers (and fathers).
The second reason for addressing Hays’ work concerns his stature. Hays
is an internationally recognized author and holds a chair in New Testament
at Duke University. Furthermore, Moral Vision is perhaps the most widely
read book on New Testament ethics in America today. The back cover displays
the superlative praise of some impressive thinkers: N.T. Wright, Stanley
Hauerwas, Leander Keck, William Klassen, and Ellen Charry. While a warm
recommendation of a book does not necessarily entail complete agreement
with all contained therein, such recommendations do, of course, affect its
public reception. The fact that Christianity Today named Hays’ book one of
the 100 best and most enduring books of the twentieth century likewise reflects
its contemporary importance.
4. And, as we know, ideas have practical,
not simply theoretical, consequences. Given Hays’ stature and respect in the
academic community and among communities of faith, his voice carries
weight, and therefore must be addressed. Furthermore, I assume that Hays’
makes his argument concerning Scripture as well as it can be made, which
likewise commends the effort to engage him.
The following will begin by summarizing Hays’ argument, and move toward
an analysis of why, despite several helpful insights, Hays misses
Scripture’s teaching on abortion. In so doing, it will seek to demonstrate
how Scripture speaks about abortion, both in condemning abortion and in
offering practical instruction concerning how to counsel women in crisis
pregnancy and those who have undergone abortion.
SPRING 2005/67
William Ross Blackburn is an Episcopal clergyman and a Ph.D. candidate in Old Testament at the
University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He and his wife Lauren have three children.
WILLIAM ROSS BLACKBURN
68/SPRING 2005
Hays’ Treatment of Scripture and Abortion
Hays frames his argument through a personal experience of a Christian
couple, whom he calls Bill and Jennifer—in their mid-forties, with children
almost grown. Jennifer discovers she is pregnant. Having decided to carry
the unexpected child to birth, the couple finds out that the child has Down’s
Syndrome. Hays uses this example to focus his discussion: “Can the New
Testament provide any guidance on this agonizing decision?”
5. Before interacting with the texts, Hays makes two comments concerning
his approach. First, he locates his discussion within the Christian community.
His primary concern is not to instruct the world, but to ask the question,
“How shall we as people who belong to Jesus Christ live faithfully under the
gospel with regard to our treatment of the issues of pregnancy, abortion, and
childbearing?”
6. Second, Hays speaks of the church’s need not to “get trapped
by the way the world defines the issue” but “to frame its moral reflection
within the categories offered to us by Scripture.”
7. In order to hear Scripture’s
witness, we must hear it speak in its own terms and categories.
Hays begins with a statement of the difficulty of the task, citing abortion
as “a major ethical issue not addressed explicitly by any New Testament
texts at all.”
8. He briefly surveys texts commonly used in the abortion discussion,
showing why each “prooftext” has either limited or no relevance to the
issue at hand.
9. He finds some cursory help in the Old Testament. For Hays,
Exodus 21:22-25 offers some help in understanding the status of the fetus:
When a pregnant woman is injured in a fight between others, the punishment
is greater in the instance of her death than it is in the instance of a
miscarriage. This reading of the text has some (albeit limited) relevance to
the discussion, according to Hays, because the text “seems to posit a qualitative
distinction between the fetus and the mother; only the latter is legally
a person with reference to whom the lex talionis applies.” Psalm 139:13-16,
which refers to God forming life in the womb, is also of some help, but must
not be leaned upon too heavily, since it is poetic and not a “scientific or
propositional statement.” Because Jeremiah 1:5 similarly speaks poetically
of God’s providence (even before conception), Hays likewise finds the text
to have no direct relevance to abortion. Hays finds no help in the Decalogue
command “thou shall not murder” (Ex. 20:13, Dt. 5:17), arguing that the
Sixth Commandment offers no insight as to whether or not abortion is murder.
Even less helpful for Hays are three New Testament texts often cited as
relevant to abortion. Hays finds those who use Luke 1:44, where Elizabeth
proclaims to Mary that “the child in my womb leapt for joy,” to oppose
abortion are guilty of “ridiculous and tendentious exegesis,” arguing that the
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text is Christological and not concerned with defining the personhood of the
fetus. Hays concedes that “the text might indirectly shape a symbolic world:
The phrase ‘the child in my womb’ implies an attitude toward the unborn
that is very different from speaking clinically of ‘the fetus.’” Hays finds
“hardly worthy of discussion” the argument that Paul’s condemnation of
pharmakeia (Gal. 5:20) refers to an ancient practice of taking drugs to induce
miscarriage, and he dismisses Jesus’ words “let the little children come
to me” (Mt. 19:14) by flatly stating that the passage obviously refers to born,
not unborn, children.
Although he finds no texts that refer directly to abortion, he does briefly
comment that the Bible regards children as a great blessing from God, that
childlessness is seen as great affliction, and that pregnancy is never seen as
a problem in the Scriptures. Against this background, Hays says, Scripture
views abortion as not so much immoral as unthinkable.
Finding no specific direction in the matter, Hays argues that Scriptural
guidance must be found indirectly. He proposes two hermeneutical strategies
for seeking practical guidance: placing the abortion issue in the broader
framework of the symbolic world of Scripture (wherein the reader seeks to
locate himself in the broader story of Scripture), and then asking if there are
Scriptural paradigms that might provide useful analogies when considering
abortion. Regarding the first, Hays sees the symbolic world of the New
Testament as affirming God as the creator of life, particularly citing John
1:3-5. Abortion, then, is seen as destroying God’s work: “Whether we
accord ‘personhood’ to the unborn child or not, he or she is a manifestation
of new life that has come forth from God. . . . we neither create ourselves nor
belong to ourselves. Within this worldview, abortion—whether it be ‘murder’
or not—is wrong for the same reason that murder and suicide are wrong:
It presumptuously assumes authority to dispose of life that does not belong
to us.”
10. Regarding his second strategy, Hays proposes three Scriptural examples
that might serve as paradigms for the church in responding to an unplanned
pregnancy. Hays begins with the Good Samaritan, using the parable to question
the categories often used in discussing abortion. The occasion for the
parable is a lawyer’s question—“who is my neighbor?”—prompted by the
Old Testament command to love one’s neighbor (Deut 6:5, Lev 19:18). Where
the lawyer was seeking to define limits to his compassion (whom was he
required to love?), Jesus’ parable in effect taught that loving one’s neighbor
means being a neighbor, which will include compassion even to those most
difficult to love (including hated foreigners). In so answering, Jesus rejected
the lawyer’s use of the category of neighbor, and recast the terms of the
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discussion. Hays sees the self-justifying character of the lawyer’s categories
as analogous to the contemporary concern over whether or not the fetus is a
“person.” If we rule that the fetus is not a person, we thereby define the
limits of our compassion, absolving ourselves of any responsibility for caring
for the child. Hays concludes the section: “The Samaritan is a paradigm
of love that goes beyond ordinary obligation and thus creates a neighbor
relation where none existed before. The concluding word of the parable addresses
us all: ‘Go and do likewise.’ What would it mean for our decisions
about abortion if we did indeed take the Samaritan as a paradigm?”
The second example Hays offers as a paradigm is the description of the
early Christian community in Acts 4:32-35. Applied to the abortion issue,
the text’s description of Christian community suggests two applications. First,
it is the responsibility of the church to make sure that a woman in need has
the resources of the Christian community (whether spiritual, economic, personal)
behind her as she works through an unplanned pregnancy. Where too
often the burden has been left to the woman alone, Acts 4 suggests crisis
pregnancy is a community issue. Secondly, the church community should
see to it that Christian fathers are not absolved of their responsibility for
caring for woman and child simply because they can walk away. The Christian
church should require Christian fathers to assume responsibility. In both
these ways the Christian community can support a woman with an unexpected
pregnancy.
The final example Hays proposes is Christ himself, particularly the texts
that call the Christian community to imitate Christ (Rom. 15:1-7, 1 Cor.
11:1, Gal. 6:2, Phil. 2:1-13). In Hays’ words “the call to ‘imitate Christ’
means that the community is to forswear seeking its own self-defined freedom
in order to render service to others, especially the ‘weak.’”
11. Again, the issue is the community bearing the burdens of those in need, as consistent
with the example of Christ.
After a brief section in which he argues that Christian tradition is unified
in its witness against abortion, Hays suggests six different lines of reasoning
that Scripture rules out as invalid. First, because the notion is foreign to
Scripture, abortion discussion should not be set up as an issue of “rights”—
such as the right to life over against the right of a woman to control her body.
Hays is clear that we are accountable to God for our decisions. Second, it is
inappropriate to insist that abortion is a matter of individual choice: An act
should be judged by whether it edifies the community and whether it faithfully
witnesses to God’s will. Third, the claim that life is sacred is unfounded
in the New Testament: Rejecting abortion is not a matter of any inherent
right to life, but rather a recognition that we have no claim to sovereignty
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over life. Sovereignty over life is God’s prerogative, not ours. Fourth, the
questions concerning the personhood of the fetus or the beginning of life are
inappropriate and cannot be answered by science or the Bible. Furthermore,
such questions often serve to justify one’s position rather than to seek true
clarity. Fifth, the quality-of-life argument—that unwanted children should
not be born—is likewise inappropriate because Jesus came to welcome the
unwanted. The community of faith should seek the “quality of life” for all.
Finally, Hays finds consequentialist arguments used against abortion (e.g.,
“What if Mary had aborted Jesus?”) both weak (e.g., “What if Hitler’s mother
had aborted him?”) and foreign to the concerns of the New Testament.
Concluding his section on the church’s response to the abortion question,
Hays claims that “though the New Testament gives no explicit prohibition,
its portrayal of God as the author and giver of life creates a general presumption
against any human decision to terminate life.”
12. For Hays, if the
church faithfully adopted the worldview and paradigms of Scripture, then
the need for abortion would decrease to almost nothing. Concerning possible
exceptions, Hays judges that abortion would be a justifiable option for
Christians in cases where rape or incest has occurred, or where the life of the
mother was at stake. Returning to the situation of his friends Bill and Jennifer,
Hays informs the reader that the couple went ahead with an abortion. In
his assessment of the morality of their action, Hays writes: “While I believe
that the witness of the New Testament should have tipped the balance the
other way in this decision, I respect the difficulty of their situation and the
moral gravity of their action. In a case where the New Testament offers us
no clear instruction, it is perhaps inevitable that Christians will in good conscience
reach different conclusions.”
13. Seeking Scripture’s Voice for the Unborn
Before addressing Hays’ broader argument, a word concerning his introduction
is warranted. Hays sets up the conflict surrounding abortion as follows:
On one side of the debate, “pro-life” advocates regard abortion as murder and are
committed to stopping it by whatever means necessary, up to and sometimes including
violent action against clinics and doctors performing abortions; on the other side,
“pro-choice” advocates regard abortion as a right essential for women if they are to
have dignity, equality with men, and freedom from oppressive social conditions.
14. In his description of the “pro-choice” position, Hays is measured and circumspect.
His characterization of “pro-choice” advocates, striving for dignity,
equality, and freedom, suggests virtue. His description of the “pro-life”
side, however, is less generous. Without drawing distinctions, Hays describes
pro-life advocates as committed to stopping abortion by “whatever means
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necessary.” Such a blanket statement is patently false. While there are opponents
of abortion who have used or threatened violence, they represent a
tiny minority, and such a statement ignores the public statements of many
opponents of abortion repudiating any type of violent reaction.
15. The difficult,underappreciated, and nonviolent character of pro-life advocacy is most
often the hard work of volunteer counselors who serve at financially struggling
crisis-pregnancy centers. Although he qualifies his statement later in
the essay, acknowledging that violence by anti-abortion activists is only occasional,
16. to set the essay up in this manner is misleading. Furthermore,
Hays neglects to mention the obvious violence of abortion. To link the prolife
position with violence based upon the actions of a very small minority,
while neglecting to mention the brutal violence associated with every act of
killing an unborn baby, is a massive distortion of the truth.
17. At best, Hays’
description of the situation is irresponsible.
His introductory remarks aside, Hays’ essay contains some helpful Scriptural
reflections on crisis pregnancy. By locating the matter within the Christian
community, Hays helpfully argues that the problem of a crisis pregnancy
is not simply a woman’s concern, but our concern. In other words, the
fact that a woman might feel isolated and driven to abortion is not only a
comment on her (and the man involved) but can also be a comment on the
Christian community. In a country such as America where Christianity is
often seen individualistically, Hays locates the problem where it belongs.
The Christian community has an imperative to care for the needy in our
midst. If one part of the body suffers, we all suffer (1 Cor. 12:26).
Hays’ treatment of the Good Samaritan is also helpful and relevant for his
discussion, since the lawyer’s move to circumscribe the extent of his responsibility
by seeking to categorize “neighbors” and “non-neighbors” is
precisely the move that abortion advocates make when questioning the
personhood of the unborn child, or “foetus.” No elaboration on the point is
necessary—Hays made the point well enough—but it goes a long way in
exposing why the terms of the discussion are often laid out in the way that
they are in contemporary debate. We will return to this later.
Ironically, it is in the issue of categories that Hays’ discussion falters. At
the beginning of his essay, he states that “our deliberation about these matters
should not be constrained by the categories and norms of a secular pluralistic
society,” lest we become “trapped by the way the world defines the
issue.”
18. Yet Hays himself utilizes categories foreign to Scripture in a manner
that precludes him seeing how the Scriptures speak directly and clearly
to abortion. The most important category Hays imposes upon the Scripture
is that of the unborn child, which has profound implications for the way
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abortion is understood. If the Christian is to insist on not letting secular
society define the terms of the debate, but rather work “within the categories
offered us by Scripture” then the categories of “unborn child” and “born
child” must be carefully examined.
In Scripture, people are distinguished by a variety of categories: Jew/Gentile,
male/female, parent/child, priest/Levite, slave/master, distinctions between
tribes, and the like. Closer to the discussion at hand, people are sometimes
categorized linguistically in terms of their time of life—children, young
men, elders, men, women, widows, young women/virgins, etc. Notably absent,
however, is any term, in either the Old Testament (MT or LXX) or the
New Testament, that sets the unborn child apart as a distinct category. Simply
put, there is no word for “foetus” in the Bible.
19. A brief survey of several
of the texts Hays cites in his discussion will illustrate the point.
The NRSV translation of Exodus 21:22-25, which Hays uses, reads as
follows:
When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage,
yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s
husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine. If any harm follows,
then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.
In the Hebrew text, the words “so that there is a miscarriage” read literally
“and her children have come out.”
20. The point is important. If we are to
insist on Biblical categories, then our discussion of the passage must revolve
around children, not (in Hays’ language) “foetuses.” This simple recognition
calls into question Hays’ inference that the passage may suggest a
difference in the personhood between born and the unborn. Reading the text
as referring to a child (rather than a miscarriage) opens the possibility of
another interpretation, such as that offered by Umberto Cassuto:
The statute commences, And when men strive together, etc., in order to give an example
of accidental injury to a pregnant woman and . . . the law presents the case
realistically. Details follow: and they hurt unintentionally a woman with child—the
sense is, that one of the combatants, whichever of them it be (for this reason the verb
translated “and they hurt” is in the plural) is responsible—and her children come
forth (i.e., there is a miscarriage) on account of the hurt she suffers (irrespective of
the nature of the fetus, be it male or female, one or two; hence here, too, there is a
generic plural as in the case of the verb ‘they hurt), but no mischief happens—that is,
the woman and the children do not die—the one who hurt her shall surely be punished
by a fine, according as the woman’s husband shall lay—impost—upon him,
having regard to the extent of the injuries and the special circumstances of the accident;
and he who caused the hurt shall pay the amount of the fine to the woman’s
husband with judges . . . But if any mischief happens, that is, if the woman dies or the
children die, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, etc.
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While I think Cassuto’s interpretation is truer to the language of the passage,
my point is not that Cassuto is right and that the text can therefore be
used to argue against abortion. The text is ambiguous enough not to carry so
much weight.
22. My point, rather, is that to suggest a difference in status
between the unborn and the born from this passage is not only speculative
but goes against the text’s plain language by imposing a category foreign to
the thought of Scripture.
The second text explicitly referring to an unborn child is Luke 1:44, where
Elizabeth tells Mary “the child in my womb leapt for joy.” Hays contends
that any attempt to use this text to speak of the personhood of the fetus
“should not be dignified with the label ‘exegesis.’”
23. Hays acknowledges
that “the phrase ‘the child in my womb’ implies an attitude toward the unborn
that is very different from speaking clinically of the fetus,”
24. but does
not give his observation much weight, precisely because the text does not
speak clinically. This, however, is precisely the point. The Scripture speaks
of an unborn child. Must the Scripture speak of the “foetus” in a clinical
manner in order for it to speak a clear word concerning the unborn? Rather
than seeking to use the categories offered in Scripture, Hays insists that Scripture
conform to our categories (and hence worldview) in order to speak a
clear word in this matter. If the attitude of Scripture toward unborn children
is that of children, are we not called to share in that same attitude, rather
than adopting the world’s definitions and attitudes? It would seem that adopting
both the language and the attitude of Scripture is the way forward in the
church’s effort “to frame its moral reflection within the categories offered to
us by Scripture.”
The same kind of confusion is apparent in Hays’ treatment of Psalm 139.
In referring to the poetic language of God’s creating the psalmist in the womb,
Hays states that the passage is of limited value to the discussion, cautioning
that it “must be interpreted within the poetic genre to which it belongs, not
as a scientific or propositional statement.”
25. Again, the question: Why must
the Bible speak in a scientific or propositional manner in order to speak of
the unborn? Does the Bible have to speak in scientific and propositional
language to convey truth? Surely Hays does not believe this—his use of the
Good Samaritan, a parable given in answer to a direct question, shows that
he sees the Bible conveying truth through figurative language. Given that
Hays later speaks of the question of “personhood” as inappropriate, why
must the statements of God knitting the psalmist together in the womb be
ruled out as having significant relevance?
Other texts could be cited (e.g., Hos. 12:3; Ruth 1:11; Jer. 20:17). Scripture
clearly and plentifully speaks about the unborn as children.
26. Understanding
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abortion within the categories given by Scripture, called for by Hays, requires
that we view unborn children with the categories and attitudes given
there. Hays himself writes: “It is inappropriate to approach the issue of abortion
by asking, “When does human life begin?” or “Is the fetus a ‘person’?”.
. . .There is no basis in Scripture for answering—or indeed even asking—
such questions.”
27. Given that Hays himself rejects an appeal to personhood,
it is curious that he requires Scripture to speak in precisely those terms if he
is to allow it a clear voice in the matter.
If the category of the “foetus” is abandoned in favor of “children,” the
Scripture can be seen speaking as directly concerning abortion as it does to
taking the life of other human beings. Surely the command “thou shalt not
murder” applies to children as it does to adults. Given that Scripture sees
both born and unborn children as children, with no qualitative distinction
between them, should not the command extend to the unborn child as fully
as to other children? Or to put it another way, if in an effort to conform more
closely to Scripture, Christians in common language replaced the word “foetus”
with the word “child,” how would that affect our reading of the Sixth
Commandment and other similar Scriptures vis-ŕ-vis abortion? If the popular
distinction between born and unborn is rejected, then all the commands
concerning the protection of the weak, the fatherless, and the innocent (commands
which run through the entire Scripture) would apply directly to the
unborn. Yet Hays’ central contention that Scripture is essentially silent on
the subject of abortion is based squarely upon his insistence that the Scriptures
he cites be read according to the modern categories of foetus/child. The
terms of the discussion are everything, which is why Scriptural categories
are so important. To frame the discussion in different terms will, of course,
lead down a different road. Hays rightly charges the church not to conform
to the categories of the world, yet fails to follow his own proposal. In fact,
this presupposition of the New Testament’s silence on the matter allows Hays
to give greater weight to tradition, reason, and experience, which has the
effect of making the issue far more complicated than it ought to be. Hays’
ultimate acceptance of Bill and Jennifer’s decision to abort their baby is
simply the logical outworking of his belief that the New Testament is silent
—a presupposition he maintains because he conforms to unbiblical categories
and thought.
Despite his assertion that Scripture does not speak directly to abortion,
Hays still finds (indirect) Scriptural grounds for opposing abortion, particularly
in his emphasis that life is a gift from God. The power of this argument
is, however, greatly diminished, for two reasons. First, in arguing that life is
a gift from God, Hays rejects the notion that life has any inherent value,
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calling the sacredness of life a “sacred cow that has no basis in the New
Testament.”
28. Hays elaborates his point by quoting Stanley Hauerwas:
The Christian prohibition against taking life rests not on the assumption that human
life has overriding value but on the conviction that it is not ours to take. The Christian
prohibition of abortion derives not from any assumption of the inherent value of
life, but rather from the understanding that as God’s creatures we have no basis to
claim sovereignty over life. . . . The Christian respect for life is first of all a statement,
not about life, but about God.
29. This contention is curious, particularly when juxtaposed with the following:
And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning: from every beast I will require it
and from man. From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man.
Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man
as his own image. (Gen. 9:5-6)
Genesis is saying that God will call to account those who murder, and then
gives the grounds for His special concern for human life: Mankind is made
as the image of God (cf. Genesis 1:26).
30. In other words, human life is sacred
because it is made as the image of the One whose name is Sacred.
31. This simple fact makes human life special. In other words, the sacredness,
or sanctity, of life, is not simply a poignant political phrase or a “sacred
cow,” but actually a deeply Biblical expression that gets to the essence of
why human life is so important to God. Human life does have intrinsic value,
precisely because it is the image of the One who is ultimately valuable. By
asserting that “the Christian prohibition of abortion derives not from any
assumption of the inherent value of life,” Hauerwas and Hays miss the central
reason that human life is important, and therefore miss Scripture’s most
important rationale for protecting human life.
And although Hays (rightly) argues that life is a gift from God, he fails to
follow his argument to its logical conclusions, particularly in the more difficult
cases. I quote the following by way of illustration:
To terminate a pregnancy is not only to commit an act of violence but also to assume
responsibility for destroying a work of God, “from whom are all things and for
whom we exist” (1 Cor. 8:6). To put the matter in these terms does not presume any
particular decision about when the fetus becomes a “person.” Whether we accord
“personhood” to the unborn child or not, he or she is a manifestation of new life that
has come forth from God. . . . There might be circumstances in which we would deem
the termination of such life warranted, but the burden of proof lies heavily upon any
decision to undertake such extreme action. . . . To understand ourselves and God in
terms of the Bible’s story is to know that we are God’s creatures. We neither create
ourselves nor belong to ourselves. Within this worldview, abortion—whether it be
“murder” or not—is wrong for the same reason that murder and suicide are wrong: It
presumptuously assumes authority to dispose of life that does not belong to us.
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Hays’ contention that abortion is destroying a work of God, the giver of life,
is important. Yet here Hays makes a distinction, saying that some extreme
circumstances would justify abortion, despite his contention that life belongs
to God. Thus the question: What circumstances would justify extinguishing
the God-given life of an unborn child? Or, to put it another way,
given that life comes from God, what is the difference between the life of
the unborn child and the life of the born child that would warrant the more
resolved protection of one over the other?
The exceptions to which Hays refers are when a pregnancy may threaten
the life of the mother, or when the child was conceived as a result of rape or
incest. In Hays’ words,
Particularly in the latter case (rape or incest), the argument to justify abortion rests
heavily upon experiential warrants: We recoil instinctively from requiring a young
woman to bear the burden of a child conceived through an act of violence against
her. As I have already indicated, such an appeal to experience carries considerably
more weight in theological argument in a case—such as this one—where there are
no direct New Testament teachings on the subject. My own view would be that such
exceptions are certainly justifiable options for Christians.
33. While recognizing the horrible circumstances surrounding a child conceived
in rape, it is difficult to see how even the most tragic of circumstances
alters the fact that life, both of mother and child, is life given by
God. Here Hays appeals to experience in his judgment that abortion is justifiable
in such a case. Yet to what experience does Hays appeal? To base
one’s argument on experience would seem to entail finding women who
have been victimized by rape (some of whom have brought the babies to
birth, some of whom have chosen to abort them), and inquiring as to their
experience and their feelings concerning their decisions. Would the women
be united in wishing they had undergone abortion, or in wishing they had
given birth to their babies, or even have a clear idea themselves in retrospect?
Are we to seek the experience of Christian women or non-Christian
women, or both? Can it be said that experience (which will of course differ
from person to person) offers a coherent basis from which to make such a
grave judgment?
34. That we are fallen creatures with impaired moral judgment
makes the appeal to experience even more problematic. Formally, Hays
acknowledges the inadequacy of experience, writing that “the various claims
and counterclaims [of experience] prove so inconclusive,”
35. yet, practically,
he gives great weight to experience, particularly in these difficult circumstances.
Hays’ insistence that Scripture is ultimately silent on abortion is
keenly felt here, for the particularly difficult cases are the ones where the
guidance of Scripture is most needed, just as light is most urgently needed
WILLIAM ROSS BLACKBURN
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where the road ahead is darkest.
The practical outworking of Hays’ appeal to experience is again seen in
his reflection on the situation of Bill and Jennifer, who ultimately decided to
take the life of their handicapped child. In Hays’ words, “here we confront a
painfully difficult problem in which the strong general presumption of Scripture
and tradition against abortion must be weighed against the heavy personal
costs of bringing such a child to birth.” Two comments are relevant
here. First, the personal cost of bringing a child with Down’s Syndrome to
birth are usually no different from bringing any other child to birth. The
majority of children with Down’s Syndrome come to birth quite normally.
The heavy personal costs—both emotional and financial—more often come
after the baby is born. To suggest that Down’s Syndrome is a pre-birth dilemma
is to evade the issue—Down’s babies are most often aborted because
of the effect they will have in a family after they are born. The only reason
that it becomes a pre-birth issue is that we have convinced ourselves that it
is acceptable to kill unborn children, or “fetuses,” but not born children. In
other words, it is precisely the quality-of-life argument that Hays rejects in
theory earlier in his paper:
Even worse is the “quality of life” argument that advocates abortion by declaring
that “no unwanted child should ever be born.” Unwanted by whom? The mother?
The argument proves too much and readily slides into an argument for infanticide
among the poor. The whole historic witness of Jesus and the community he founded
has been to receive and love the unwanted, not to recommend that they be terminated,
“put out of their misery” through death. The community of faith should commit
itself to seeking “quality of life” for all who are born into the world, whether
their parents want them or not.
Given Hays’ categorical rejection of any quality-of-life argument, why then
does he suggest that Bill and Jennifer might be justified in their decision for
abortion? According to Hays’ account, Bill and Jennifer had decided to have
their baby before they discovered the baby had Down’s Syndrome. The issue,
then, that caused Bill and Jennifer to decide finally to have an abortion
was precisely a quality-of-life issue. Rather than having to do with life in
utero, this decision was made based upon quality of life (and here Hays
speaks more of the quality of life of the parents) outside of the womb.
And is not the Christian Gospel about laying down one’s life for the brethren?
Is it not about living a life of sacrifice in service of God and others,
particularly the weak? Are not “the heavy personal costs” precisely what
God calls His people to bear, individually and communally? Hays’ argument
seems to deny both the call to live sacrificially and God’s blessing
when we do. Given his emphasis on the cross and his call to imitate Christ,
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particularly on behalf of the weak, it is difficult to understand his conclusion:
“While I believe that the New Testament should have tipped the balance
the other way on this decision, I respect the difficulty of their situation
and the moral gravity of their action. In a case where the New Testament
offers us no clear instruction, it is perhaps inevitable that Christians will in
good conscience reach different conclusions.”
36. But it is one thing to acknowledge the difficulty of Bill and Jennifer’s
situation; it is quite another to imply that their choice for abortion is a legitimate
Christian option. To respect “the moral gravity of their action,” whatever
that means, does not justify that action. To query, as Hays does, whether
abortion might be a “necessary choice” in this circumstance is a betrayal of
the Gospel, even as Hays himself expresses it.
Practical Proposals
Calling Hays’ appeal to experience inadequate is, of course, not helpful in
the absence of an alternative. How would locating ourselves more firmly in
the worldview of Scripture inform our judgment in the matter, and particularly
in the difficult circumstances of rape or incest? The assumption that the
woman would be better off killing the child is not supported by Scripture,
but utterly constrained by the reasoning of the world. Here the type of paradigmatic
thinking that Hays employs in his treatment is particularly helpful.
To locate the circumstance in Scripture might be to remember that God is a
God who brings good out of evil, as Joseph remembered when he said to his
brothers “you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good” (Gen. 50:20).
God has done it in the past and he will do it in the future: “And we know
God works all things together for the good of those who love him, who have
been called according to his purpose” (Rom. 8:28). In other words, it is vital
to remember that the God we know in Scripture brings good through even
the darkest of circumstances, a message that must be sensitively and confidently
brought to any woman in a crisis pregnancy, particularly if she has
suffered a rape. Some, of course, may see such reasoning as insensitive or
unrealistic. Yet, is not this the essence of faith: believing what we cannot
see, and trusting God as we seek to follow His guidance? Is faith not “the
assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Heb. 11:1)?
Put another way, why compound the already terrible problem of rape by
killing the child? If we are going to step meaningfully into the world of
Scripture, these are precisely the questions that must be asked. The assumption
that abortion makes the best of a bad situation shows how little we
really know of faith.
Does it seem ridiculous to suggest that it might be best for the woman’s
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sake to bring the baby to birth than to abort her? While again the suggestion
may, to some, seem strange, insensitive, or unrealistic, for those who
believe that God works all things together for good for those who love Him,
it is simply an affirmation that, in the way God works things together, what
is best for the baby will also be what is best for the mother. What is best for
the baby is obvious, and it is never abortion. What is best for the mother may
not seem so apparent, perhaps only seen by faith. This does not mean that
bearing a baby conceived in rape will not be hard and painful. Nor does
it assume anything regarding what should happen once the baby is born
(such as whether or not the baby should be adopted). It is simply a way to
help a woman not to be overcome by evil, but to overcome evil with good
(Rom. 12:21).
This is, of course, a call for the community of faith to step up sacrificially
on behalf of the woman and the child. Here is where I find Hays most helpful
in his discussion of abortion—reminding the church of the too-oftenforgotten
truth that abortion is a community issue. Does the woman need a
place to live, short or long term, in order to bear the baby, or bear and subsequently
raise the baby? Who in the church will open their home? Is the
woman in need of financial help? Who has an abundance to help her in her
need (2 Cor. 8:13-14)? Will the baby need to be adopted? Who will take him
in? Does the father need to be called back into this circumstance by other
men in the church, or assisted in some way to support the mother and baby?
These are all concerns that the church can address. In other words, in seeking
to follow the Scripture’s guidance in this matter, the mother’s concern,
the father’s concern, and the child’s concern become our concern.
Hays argues this point precisely, retelling William Willimon’s account of
a group of ministers debating abortion. The dialogue, which begins with the
testimony of a black minister concerning a pregnant teenager, bears repeating:
“We have young girls who have this happen to them. I have a fourteen-year-old in
my congregation who had a baby last month. We’re going to baptize the child next
Sunday,” he added.
“Do you really think that she is capable of raising a little baby?” another minister
asked.
“Of course not,” he replied. “No fourteen-year-old is capable of raising a baby.
For that matter, not many thirty-year-olds are qualified. A baby’s too difficult for
any one person to raise by herself.”
“So what do you do with the babies?” they asked.
“Well, we baptize them so that we all raise them together. In the case of that
fourteen-year-old, we have given her baby to a retired couple who have enough time
and enough wisdom to raise children. They can then raise the mama along with her
baby. That’s the way we do it.”
37. THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW
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This kind of testimony shows how faithfulness to Scripture need not be
inconsistent with an appeal to experience.
If the above analysis is correct, and the Bible does speak clearly on the
matter of abortion, what is the practical effect? I want to suggest several
implications for the life of the church. First, if unborn children are seen
simply as children, then it follows that God is very serious about abortion,
and does not see it differently than any other shedding of innocent blood
(e.g., Jer. 22:3). The issue needs to be in the foreground of the church’s
understanding of what it means to live as a faithful people who are concerned
to do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with God (Micah 6:8).
The fact that 1.5 million babies are killed annually in the United States alone
means that the issue is not far off, but in fact very near. Isaiah’s exhortation
to Israel is relevant today: “Seek justice, correct oppression; defend the fatherless,
plead for the widow” (Is. 1:17). Who are the fatherless? Might not
they include unborn babies whose fathers have left, leaving the mother alone
with the baby and all that surrounds childbearing and childrearing, or those
babies whose fathers seek to deal with the “problem” through encouraging
(or sometimes insisting upon) abortion? Who are the widows? Might not
they include the many pregnant women in crisis pregnancies who find themselves
alone and vulnerable, like the widow of whom Scripture speaks? The
different ways the Christian community might go about correcting oppression,
defending the fatherless, and pleading for the widow are very important
questions, but perhaps beyond the scope of this discussion (although
some ways have been suggested already). Suffice it to say at this point that
the Christian church is not given the option of simply sitting back.
Second, it is important for the church to remember that the issue includes
both the fatherless and the widow. Too often the discussion gets set up as a
conflict between the best interests of the woman and the best interests of the
child. Scripture would say that God works together for the best of both. The
welfare of the mother should be as important to the church as the welfare of
the baby. Where the welfare of the mother is not also squarely in view, the
church loses its authority to speak in the matter.
Third, understanding unborn children as children should clarify the
church’s position on abortion. Too often abortion is approached as an
unfortunate matter with valid points on both sides. When the Israelites were
engaged in child sacrifice (Jer. 32:35, Ezek. 16:20), it is not difficult to imagine
that some rather vigorous debate took place within the covenant community
concerning the morality of the practice. It is difficult, however, to imagine
the faithful Israelite deciding that there was merit on both sides, and remaining
in a state of ambivalence. Rather, the prophets were decisive in their
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denunciation of the practice, and left no room for ambiguity. Without belittling
the difficulty of crisis pregnancies in people’s lives, the church must
respond with a clear word. In fact, it is precisely because circumstances
surrounding crisis pregnancies can be so difficult that the church must be
clear. While there may be a place for debate, under particular circumstances,
God’s word concerning children is primarily a matter to be proclaimed and
acted upon.
Fourth, if the church would take on the worldview of Scripture that the
unborn are children, we would do well, insofar as possible, to adopt the
language of Scripture. Language, as we have seen above, can be used to
conceal things, or bring them into the open, and is powerful in forming our
perception of truth. Euphemisms such as “terminating a pregnancy,” “fetus,”
and even “abortion”
38. should be avoided. Such language tends to cloud
the truth, both for ourselves and for those to whom we speak. For the sake of
public discourse, such euphemisms should be exposed, then abandoned.
Finally, any proclamation that the unborn are children must be brought
hand in hand with the Gospel. There are too many people who have been
involved in abortion one way or another not to realize that abortion is a
painfully personal discussion for many. No one can hear the truth concerning
abortion unless he or she has ears to hear. For those who have been
involved in abortion (whether undergoing one or enabling one in some way),
it will often be too painful to admit they have participated in taking the life
of a child, unless they can understand that God forgives abortion. It is therefore
imperative that the Scriptural truth concerning forgiveness and restoration
be kept at the center of the discussion: “If we confess our sins, he is
faithful and just to forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness”
(I John 1:9). For many, abortion is a not a head issue, but a heart issue. If one
does not have a sense that he can handle the guilt of admitting the truth
concerning abortion, it is easier to hide behind arguments. The Gospel must
be brought to the forefront. This recognition is another way of allowing
Scripture to mold our reflections.
Clearly, approaching the issue of abortion from a Scriptural perspective is
a far more encompassing task than is often understood, and yet imperative if
the church is going to respond faithfully to the issue, both in word and in
deed.
One final thought concerning a Christian response to the reality of abortion.
Roughly 45 million children have been killed due to abortion since
1973 in the United States. Assuming that the mother and the father were
both parties to the death of the child (as is often the case), then 90 million
people have been involved in abortion. There are, of course, abortionists
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and clinic workers, those who fundraise for organizations that promote abortion,
and others, adding to the number, as well as women who may have had
multiple abortions, subtracting from it. The exact numbers are not really
important, save that they bring to mind the vast extent of the problem—
there are millions of people in the United States who bear the guilt of abortion.
The practical implication for the church? Here is a tremendous opportunity
for the sharing of the Gospel. If one were to put it into the perspective
of a missionary, it could be said that there is a people-group in the United
States well over 100 million strong joined by a common experience of being
involved in abortion, some of whom may have turned away from God simply
because they believe that they have forfeited their place with Him. In
other words, the church’s call in responding to abortion is not only in defending
the unborn and supporting their parents, but to bear witness to the
world that “there is now therefore no condemnation for those who are in
Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8:1). I have heard it best said by a father of six:
The challenge for the Christian churches: Make sure that 80 million or more people
in this country, and hundreds of millions throughout the world, hear the Good News,
and make sure they hear, specifically, that it is Good News for people who have
killed their own children. To many, it will be very Good News that God, the Creator,
knows them and knows their sin—and that He loves them! Our sin does not change
the fact that God loves us! It is very good news that Jesus died for the sins of the
world, and that we can stand in the presence of the living God, forgiven and free,
with a new life bound up in the life of our risen Lord and Savior. People need to hear
this, and people whose lives have been destroyed by the sin of abortion will at least
listen to the message of forgiveness. They know abortion not as an abstraction, but
as the father or mother of a slain child knows it, and they need the kind of help they
can find only in the Gospel, only in Jesus.
39. How best to reach such people is a matter for much thought and prayer, but
the opportunity is there for the taking (Eph. 5:16, Col. 4:5).
NOTES
1. Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 444-
461.
2. I do not assume that Hays himself would call his position “pro-choice.” Whether or not this is a
fair designation of Hays’ position I leave for the reader to decide.
3. Hays, 457.
4. “Books of the Century” in Christianity Today, vol. 44, No. 5 (April 24, 2000), p. 92. CT’s list was
the result of a survey of religious leaders.
5. Hays, 445.
6. Hays, 445.
7. Hays, 445.
8. Hays, 445. While primarily concerned with New Testament ethics, Hays’ treatment of abortion
uses the Old Testament as well.
9. For Hays’ treatment of the Biblical “prooftexts,” see 446-448.
10. Hays, 450.
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11. Hays, 452.
12. Hays, 456-7.
13. Hays, 457.
14. Hays, 444.
15. E.g., the 1994 statement of Fr. Frank Pavone, director of Priests for Life: “The shooting of
abortionists is wrong.” Later, in 2000 (after Hays’ work was published), Pavone declared that
“Priests for Life strongly condemns violence against any abortion provider, and is saddened to
hear of the stabbing of [abortion provider] Dr. Gary Romalis.” In fact, in 2001 Priests for Life
offered $50,000 to anyone who might provide information leading to the arrest of those involved
in shooting abortionists. The offer was made on April 4, 2001, precisely in recognition
(and admiration) of the nonviolent work of Martin Luther King Jr. See http://
www.priestsforlife.org/articles/rejectviolence.htm.
16. Hays, 458.
17. Hays, 450, mentions abortion violence, almost in passing, when speaking of abortion as destroying
God’s work. Curiously, Hays is clear that anti-abortion violence is “incompatible with
the Gospel” (458), but is willing to view certain cases of abortion violence as “justifiable options
for Christians” (456). Why he allows for violence in one case and not the other is never
addressed.
18. Hays, 445-46.
19. “MT” is the Masoretic Text (Hebrew); “LXX” is the Septuagint (Greek). “Fetus” is a Latin word
that means offspring.
20. That many contemporary English Bibles translate the words weyatse’u yeladeyha with “there is
a miscarriage” is itself an example of how our modern Western worldview differs from that of
the Bible. The Hebrew phrase brings the child into the foreground, whereas the English rendering
hides the child from view, focusing instead on an event, the miscarriage. While this may
seem a small point, it is exactly the same move made by many who seek to justify abortion by
minimizing or removing altogether the presence of the child, whether by declaring the child a
non-person, or by refusing to refer to the child altogether. It is for this reason that one never sees
advocates of abortion rights publicly refer to the unborn child as a child or baby. If the child is
referred to at all, it is always as a “foetus,” “embryo,” or similar terms. Likewise, it is much
easier to speak of the termination of a pregnancy, or even an abortion (both of which do not
refer to the child, but to an event), rather than the killing of a child or baby (which again brings
the child into view).
21. Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, 1967), 275.
22. Even if the text is speaking of a child who has died in “coming forth,” there is still reason to
question the inference that the child was considered less important because the punishment was
less severe. Biblically there is a great difference between intentional and unintentional sin. The
intentional sin is covered by sacrifice (Lev. 4:2, 13, 22, 27), the defiant sin requires the offender
to be “cut off” from his people (Num. 15:22-31). The intentional murderer is to be condemned
to death, while the one who kills unintentionally may flee to a pre-appointed city of refuge
(Exod. 21:12-15). One could reasonably assume that the death of an unborn child would be the
unintended consequence of striking the woman (which itself appears unintentional here as well),
and therefore not liable to capital punishment. Whether or not this legal distinction concerning
intentionality is behind the law of Exod. 21:22-25, it is nonetheless a plausible possibility,
which should give us pause before using this text to suggest a distinction between born and
unborn children.
